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Returns to Education in Professional Football 
 
After three years in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), collegiate football 
players face a trade-off between spending more time in the NCAA and pursuing a career in 
the National Football League (NFL) by declaring for the draft. We analyze the starting 
salaries and signing bonuses for 1,673 rookies in the NFL, who entered the league between 
2001 and 2009 through the NFL draft. We instrument the endogenous decision to enter the 
professional market with a player’s month of birth. A player’s true talent is only imperfectly 
observed and the instrument provides a causal link between time at college and subsequent 
salaries in the NFL through the relative age effect. Our estimates suggest that a player 
enjoys a 6% higher starting salary in the NFL, and a 15% higher first-year signing bonus, for 
each year with the college team. On average, a rookie is estimated to earn $131,000 more in 
his rookie season, if he enters the NFL one year later. Our analysis of a typical labor market 
in professional sports shows that the returns to education in sports are sizeable and 
surprisingly similar to returns to formal education. The results of our analysis provide 
information for the players who are deciding about declaring for the draft, however, also 
colleges and the teams in the NFL may find the results of interest. 
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 1 Introduction
The typical path to playing in the NFL starts in school and almost all players
who played in the NFL from 2001 onwards started their career in various youth
football teams during school and continued to play for their high school team.
Colleges devote substantial resources to recruit high school graduates for their
college football teams (Dumond, Lynch and Platania, 2008). The National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) organizes 88 championships in 23 sports in
US colleges and universities, including football. After three years in the NCAA,
a football player may declare for the draft, i.e., declare his ambitions to play
professionally in the National Football League (NFL). Under NCAA regulations,
players are not allowed to receive any form of nancial compensation. More
time in the NCAA may be interpreted as an investment in sector-specic human
capital. Players realize their returns on the investment primarily through a con-
tract with a NFL team. A football player thus faces a trade-o between joining
the NFL and the additional time in college devoted to training and to gaining
experience, which may improve the chance of a better contract in the NFL.
The decision to enter the NFL is a function of a player's true level of talent,
which is only imperfectly observed, and therefore endogenous. A player will
declare for the NFL once he believes that he will be drafted and will receive
an acceptable contract. The empirical association of time with the college team
and the salary in the NFL might be misleading for the evaluation of returns to
the time in the NCAA, because a player's true talent is not observed. Players
who are relatively more talented will tend to have shorter college careers and
will receive higher oers. Estimates of returns to training and experience will
1therefore be biased. This ability bias can be avoided by using an instrumental
variable approach.
We use the month of birth as an instrument for the endogenous decision
to join the NFL. The month of birth of a player is random and should not
be correlated with the player's talent.1 A player's decision to enter the draft
will depend on several factors, including his true level of talent and the mental
and physical maturity by the time of declaring. Mental and physical maturity
will be judged relatively to the other competitors in a season's draft class. A
draft class consists of one or more cohorts, dened by compulsory schooling laws.
Within each school cohort there exists a relative age eect (RAE), which explains
dierences in maturity. The RAE causes relatively older players to start their
professional career earlier than relatively younger ones in their cohorts (Baker,
Schorer and Cobley, 2010). The month of birth provides the exogenous variation
that we exploit to identify the causal eect of time in the NCAA to dierences
in NFL rookie contracts, overcoming the endogeneity of the decision to declare
for the draft.
Edgar and O'Donoghue (2005) show that in most sports competitions that
involve young athletes the selection of players is inuenced by the RAE. The RAE
appears relevant also in other circumstances. For example, Dhuey and Lipscomb
(2008) estimate that relatively oldest students in school cohorts are 4{11 percent
more likely to be high school leaders, which makes them more successful in later
life. Du, Gao and Levi (2009) investigate the relation between month of birth and
CEO performance and suggest that rms are more protable, if they are managed
1See Card (2001) for a survey, or Angrist and Krueger (1991) who use the time of birth as
instruments.
2by a relatively older manager. McCrary and Royer (2011), however, nd small
eects on fertility and infant health for women who are relatively older.
Our research contributes to two strands of the economic literature, the re-
turns on investment in sector-specic skills in the labor market and, secondly, the
economics of sport. The economic aspects of the NFL have attracted academic
interest and studies have been undertaken to investigate hiring strategies (Berri
and Simmons, 2009; Boulier et al., 2010; Hendricks et al., 2003), rent-seeking
(Bishop et al., 1990) or union behavior (Gramm and Schnell, 1994). We consider
the results of our estimates to be valuable information for the players, the colleges
and, indeed, the managers of the teams that compete in the NFL. Our results
suggest that there are signicant returns to spending more time in colleges for
football players. These returns consist of higher starting salaries and, through
seniority based rules, lead to more income over the entire professional career. We
estimate that a player receives a 6% higher starting salary in the NFL, and a 15%
higher rst-year signing bonus, for each year with the college team. On average,
a player is estimated to earn $130,000 more in his rookie season, if he enters the
NFL one year later.
2 The Relative Age Eect
Compulsory schooling in the US typically requires children to start school on
the 1st of January in the year in which they turn 6. Therefore, students born
earlier in the year enter school at an older age than those born later. See Angrist
and Krueger (1991). The month of birth may inuence educational attainment
during compulsory school due to the fact that, on average, older children are
relatively more mature|both physically and mentally|than younger children.
3Cobley, Baker, Wattie and McKenna (2009) state that the 1-year dierence in
age during puberty explains most dierences in physical development and per-
formance. These eects should perhaps become less important on reaching full
(mental and physical) maturity.
Although football players are on average 23 years old, i.e., they have already
reached full physical strength, the RAE might be important for a second reason.
The (almost) unique route to playing in the NFL is through school, high-school
and college teams. If relatively older students have a higher chance to be selected
into the school's football team than their relatively younger peers, they receive
more training or more time on the playing eld. As a consequence, players who
were born early in the year have an advantage over those born later in their birth
cohort. They should join the NFL earlier than their relatively younger peers,
simply because they have acquired more specic human capital.
Thus especially in sports where physical attributes such as height, weight or
physical strength are important, players who are relatively older have an advan-
tage and will be overrepresented. Helsen et al. (2000), Helsen et al. (2005) and
Edgar and O'Donoghue (2005) nd the RAE in competitive sports that involve
young athletes and especially in soccer it is a well documented phenomenon
(Barnsley et al., 1992; Mujika et al., 2009; Vaeyens et al., 2005). Musch and
Grondin (2001) state that the empirical literature has not yet been able to nd
evidence for a RAE in American football. Indeed, a simple tabulation of the
frequencies of the months of birth of the players may lead to such a conclusion.
See Figure 1. This Figure plots the frequencies of the months of birth of 1,673
players who started to play in the National Football League between 2001 and
2009 and who were selected through the draft.
4However, a more detailed analysis, as provided in Figure 2, does show em-
pirical evidence for the RAE in American football. We plot the average age by
quarter of birth of 11;500 players, who were drafted between 1960 and 2000, for
each draft. Every year, of the players who started to play football professionally,
those who were born in the rst month of a year were younger than those who
were born in later months.2 This, in our view, is compelling evidence in favor
of the RAE in the selection of players in the NFL. In essence, the distribution
of birth months in the NFL is more uniformly distributed than in other sports,
as players can|and do|choose to enter the draft later to compensate for the
disadvantage of the late birth month.
The dierences between the birth quarters in Figure 2 are due to players who
had been born later in their birth cohort and extended their collegiate career by
remaining four rather than three years in the NCAA. The additional year in
the NCAA may compensate for less training due to the RAE. In addition, a
football player may, in agreement with the team and coach, extend the time with
the college team to ve years by \redshirting". Redshirting is the intentional
suspension of the right to participate in NCAA competitions, while permitting
a player the participation in training and other team activities. Redshirting
prolongs the normal period of team membership and is typically used to provide
the athlete with additional time for training and development.
After the end of the college season in January, football players declare for
the draft. The draft is conducted at the end of April. The teams, in reverse order
of the previous season, select a player in each round of the draft. Since 1994 a
draft consists of seven rounds. A team that has drafted a player has exclusive
2The age is calculated as the dierence between the year of draft and the year of birth
to eliminate variation that is caused by the seasonality of hiring. In the NFL, contracts are
typically signed in spring for the next season.
5bargaining rights with this player. Contracts are typically signed between the
draft and the start of the next season, in September. In the summer months,
training camps and team activities are organized and the performance in the
training camps reveals more about a player's talent. Contracts are typically
nalized during this period.
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
Our data describe 1;673 players who started to play in the National Football
League between 2001 and 2009 and were selected through the draft.3 All data
were constructed from various sources, obtained from Pro Football References
and USA Today.4 The data provide detailed information on the characteristics
of the players at the time they started their professional career, such as height
and weight, in which round of the NFL draft they were drafted, and at which pick
in the draft. All salary data include information on base salary, signing bonus
and overall salary in a player's rst season.5
Figure 3 plots the average age of drafted players, by their quarter of birth,
for our estimating sample. Similar to Figure 2, we see a marked pattern. Players
who were born in the rst quarter of their cohort were on average almost a year
younger than players who were born in the fourth quarters.
Table 1 presents descriptives statistics of key variables. Players were on
average slightly younger than 23 years of age when they joined the NFL, with a
standard deviation of less than one year. Unfortunately, we know exact college
3These are almost 73% of all players who were drafted in this period.
4Data are available at USA Today (Retrieved Feb. 2011).
5All salary data was downloaded from the USA TODAY Salary Database available at http:
//content.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/salaries/default.aspx. All salary data
were deated to year 2001 prices using the consumer price index.
6tenure only for a subset of players, namely those who declared after three years
in college (\underclassmen"), for the drafts 2004 to 2009. These players were on
average 22 years old. All other players, i.e., those who stays in college longer,
had a mean age of 23 years. Figure 6 plots the age distribution for this sub-
sample, distinguishing between these for whom we know that they declared as
underclassmen and for those who declared later, but where we do not know
exactly how many years they played for the college team. The dierence in mean
age of one year indicates that the age in the year of the draft is a good proxy for
college tenure.
Salaries, including rookie contracts, are regulated by the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement (CBA) between the NFL and the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA) (NFL, 2006). The CBA was introduced in 1993
and extended ve times until 2009. The agreement stipulates, amongst other
rules, that players who are selected earlier in the draft have to obtain higher
salaries than players who are selected later. The rst-year salary will increase
each year, according to a seniority wage scale which is detailed in the agreement.
From 2001 to 2009, base salaries were on average about $285,000 and signing
bonuses on average some $686,000. Figure 4 plots the average values for the two
salary components over all drafts from 2001 to 2009. We see that base salaries
remained fairly at throughout the early 2000s, and increased towards the end
of the period. Signing bonuses, on average about three times the base salary,
declined between 2003 and 2006, however, they appear to have increased in recent
years.
Figure 5 shows for each quarter of births the average values for the salary
components. We see that the quarters do not dier in terms of base salary.
7Signing bonuses, however, are on average lower for those who were born in the
rst quarter than for those of later birth quarters. The average signing bonus for
players who were born in the rst quarter was $620,000 and about $680,000 for
those born in the fourth quarter.6
We estimate for each player i the salary and length of career Y , where we
instrument entry age with month of birth Q:
Yi = 0 + 1Entry Agei + X + "i; (1)
Entry Agei = 0 +
12 X
m=2
Qm + X + i; (2)
where Entry Age is the age in the year of the draft, Entry Age is the predicted
value of player i's entry age, and X is a vector of controls including height,
position, whether a player played for the BCS champion of the season before the
draft, the draft round and the pick the player was drafted, and the year of the
draft.7 We control for compulsory school regulations which were in place in the
state at the time the player was born to account for dierences in compulsory
school regulations. Other controls include the team that picked the player and
interactions between year of the draft and the team.
Height is a characteristic that has previously been shown to matter for selec-
tion. We control for a player's draft status as it will determine the salary volume
through the NFL's collective bargaining agreement. Position xed-eects are in-
cluded because dierent positions require dierent levels of physical strength and
could be inuenced dierently by the RAE. The inclusion of dummy variables for
the year of the draft controls for the evolution of NFL rookie salaries over time.
6A formal test allows to reject the equality of these values at an error level of 5 percent.
7Weight is a characteristic that is of direct control to a player, i.e., endogenous, and should
therefore not be included in these estimates.
8Team xed eects control for dierences in draft behavior between teams, e.g.,
a preference for certain positions. An interaction of team and draft year should
control for a specic demand a team had in a certain year, e.g., for a defensive
rather than an oensive position. Such a demand could inuence both the se-
lection process, i.e., the pick, as well as the contract negotiations with rookie
players, i.e., the signing bonus.
A player's past performance in the NCAA might provide an indicator of his
talent. However, there are few indicators that are comparable across all positions,
because statistics are position-specic. For example, performance measures such
as the passer-eciency rating is only meaningful for the evaluation of quarter-
backs. We, however, include a variable that indicates whether a player played for
the BCS champion in the year before the draft.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the inuence of a player's entry age
into the NFL on his salary. We present separate equations for the base salary,
the signing bonus and the total salary. For comparison, we tabulate the results
from instrumenting age with the month of birth and standard OLS regressions.
The results of our instrumental variable approach show a consistent and posi-
tive inuence of entry age on a player's earnings in his rst year in the NFL.
For the estimated eect of age on the salary, we provide the estimated coe-
cient, the elasticity and the standardized (beta) coecient. In each case, OLS
underestimates the true relationship due to the endogeneity of the player's entry
decision.
9A later entry age corresponds to a longer time with the college football team,
i. e., more accumulated sector-specic human capital, and we interpret this as
returns to education in professional football. A one-year increase in entry age
will increase a player's base salary by about 5.9 percent and the signing bonus by
about 15 percent. Total salary is estimated to increase by about 12.3 percent. In
absolute terms, an athlete can increase his total salary as a rookie by more than
$131,000 by staying in college football for an additional year.
We also estimate that later compulsory school age leads to a higher signing
bonus, but we nd no signicant dierences for the base salary. We interpret this
result as indication that older students prot more from training than younger
ones. We nd no evidence that the age at which compulsory schooling ends has
an eect on NFL rookie contracts. This is, however, not surprising, as players
who intend to play professionally have to be recruited by a college, i.e., they will,
almost without exception, obtain a high school degree. A player's height at the
time of the draft, and by age 23 most men are fully grown, had no statistically
signicant eect on the salary. (If there is any eect of height on salary, there is
a small negative eect on the base salary.)8
A perhaps unexpected result is the eect of having been a member of the
reigning BCS champion, which is negative and sizeable. A player is estimated
to have a $270,000 lower signing bonus, if he won the BCS championship. We
interpret this result as a consequence of a group eect. Players who had won
the BCS championship appear more talented because a winning team has an
above average level of talent. This positive signal leads to a higher chance of
being drafted. In our sample, about 2:1 players were on average drafted from
8The estimated coecients on the xed-eects and interaction terms reect institutional
settings, for example, players who are picked earlier have higher salaries or quarterbacks earn
more than kickers. These results are available on request.
10a non-champion college team between 2001 and 2009. In contrast, an average
of 5 players were drafted from the reigning BCS champion team. However, an
individual player's talent is revealed during the summer training camps. A lower
signing bonus, which provides hiring teams with wage exibility, might be the
consequence.
The reliability of our rst stage can be gauged by the F-test on our excluded
instruments. (We use the method proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006).)
The test statistic has a value of 19.2, which rejects the null hypothesis that
the instruments are weak. Figure 7 plots the rst stage coecients of birth
months dummies on entry age, where January is the base category. The rst
stage demonstrates that players born in later months of the year are relatively
older when they enter they declare for the draft. These estimates formally conrm
the presence of the RAE in the NFL, supporting the suggestive correlations of
Figure 2. Table 4 reports the estimated coecients and their p values. Figure 7
suggests that dierences between the months of birth are statistically signicant
for those born in the second half of the year. We have experimented with dierent
sets of instruments, aggregating months to quarters and halves. The results are
tabulated in Table 3. The estimated eects change only slightly and our above
results are conrmed.
4.1 Length of career
Each player faces a trade-o between declaring for the NFL early and the starting
salary, which increases over time due to seniority rules. We estimated that the
starting salary is the higher, the longer the player remained in college. If, however,
the player shortens his career by remaining in college longer, this higher starting
11salary (and the subsequent pay rises) may not compensate for lower earnings due
to a shorter career.
We estimate a linear probability of playing in the next season, where we
also instrument entry age with the month of birth. The results of the estimation
are tabulated in Table 5, alongside with estimates where we use the quarter of
birth or the half year of birth as instruments. The results from these estimations
consistently show that a later entry age lowers the probability of playing in the
next season. This demonstrates that being older when declaring for the draft
increases the starting salary, however, at the cost of a shorter career.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed NFL starting wages for 1;673 players, who started their professional
football career between 2001 and 2009. We nd, in contrast to earlier research,
a sizeable relative age eect. The RAE inuences the age at which a player
declares for the draft and therefore provides a good instrument. Our estimates
show that players who are older when they are drafted receive higher wages,
especially signing bonuses, than those who are younger. However, players face
a trade-o between being selected in the draft, the wage and the length of their
career. We interpret the higher wage for players who are older when they start
their professional football career as returns to education as they spend more time
with their college team. The size of these returns are comparable to estimates of
the returns to formal education.
Players will benet from playing an additional season with their college team
as they will gain additional training and experience. The uniform distribution of
12the rookies' birth months is an indication that declaration for the draft is endoge-
nous, with players who were born later in the year postponing their declaration
for the draft.
Our results contribute to the ongoing discussion about whether football play-
ers should be allowed to enter the NFL without a college career or not. Moreover,
the NCAA system has drawn some criticism. For example, Kahn (2007) argues
that the NCAA is a cartel that extracts rents from the exploitation of young
football players, who do not earn wages. Our results show that players actually
gain experience from their time in the NCAA that leads to subsequent returns
in form of higher wages. If these later wages compensate for the loss in income
during the players' time with the NCAA, remains to be researched.
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Note: N=1,673 players drafted between 2001 and 2009.
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Note: Each point gives the average age of the players drafted in that year, by
their quarter of births. N=11,500, on average 250 to 350 players were drafted
each season from 1960 to 2000.
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Note: Each point gives the average age of the players drafted in that year, by
their quarter of births. N=1,673.
































2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Signing Bonus Base Salary
Total Salary
Note: N=1,673 players. Each year from 2003 on at least 224 players are drafted.
In 2001 and 2002 the Houston Texans were not in operation yet, leading to 217
regular draft picks. Salaries deated to 2001 prices.




















Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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Note: N=1,673 players. Each year from 2003 on at least 224 players are drafted.
In 2001 and 2002 the Houston Texans were not in operation yet, leading to 217
regular draft picks. Salaries deated to 2001 prices.
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age_min
Estimated Kernel Density for other players
Estimated Kernel Density for Underclassmen
Note: Kernel: Gaussian, bandwidth = 0,1711. All Underclassmen stayed at
college for three years. All remaining players stayed either four our ve years
before they declared eligible for the NFL draft. Mean age of underclassmen is
about 22, while all other players enter the NFL at a mean age of about 23.
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Note: N=1,673 players over the period 2001{9. Coecients, and the 95% con-
dence interval, are from the rst stage regression of NFL starting age on all
exogenous regressors and a set of dummy variables for the month of birth.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of key variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Entry Age 22.89 0.84
Base Salary 2.85 2.08
Signing Bonus 6.86 11.63
Total Salary 9.72 12.43
N=1,673 players. All data on in-
dividual characteristics were ob-
tained from the Pro Football
References database available at
pro-football-reference.com.
All salary components measured
in $ 100,000. Data on salaries
were collected from the USA TO-
DAY Salary Database at http://
content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/
football/nfl/salaries/team.
23Table 2: Estimated Eect of Entry Age on Rookie Contracts.
Base salary Signing bonus Total Salary
IVa OLSa IVb OLSb IVc OLSc
Entry Age in Years
Coecient 0.188* -0.097 1.122* 0.442 1.310** 0.344
Standard error (0.099) (0.067) (0.593) (0.384) (0.618) (0.403)
Elasticity (in %)d [5.926] [-3.068] [15.017] [5.909] [12.310] [3.236]
Beta coeciente f0.065g f0.076g f0.083g
Entry Age Compulsory Schoolf 0.025 0.036 0.573** 0.600* 0.598** 0.636*
(0.060) (0.073) (0.265) (0.333) (0.282) (0.356)
Exit Age Compulsory Schoolg -0.079 -0.089 0.008 -0.016 -0.071 -0.104
(0.053) (0.066) (0.224) (0.287) (0.205) (0.264)
Height (in cm) -0.017* -0.015 0.029 0.034 0.012 0.019
(0.009) (0.011) (0.051) (0.061) (0.053) (0.064)
BCS Championh -0.387 -0.352 -2.711** -2.626* -3.098** -2.979*
(0.332) (0.394) (1.227) (1.515) (1.406) (1.718)
Draft Pick Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Position FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Draft Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team*Draft Interaction FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.389 0.394 0.396 0.443 0.447
F-Statisticsi 19.733 19.733 19.733
*, ** and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent level. Robust standard
errors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) clustered for state of birth in parentheses.
a Dependent variable is Base Salary in Rookie Season in 100,000 USD. b Dependent Variable is
Signing Bonus in Rookie Season in 100,000 USD. c Dependent Variable is Total Salary in Rookie
Season in 100,000 USD. All Salary Data was obtained from the USA TODAY Salary Database. d
This elasticity gives the percentage change in the salary category due to an one percentage point
increase in entry measured in years. Dependent variable is equal to
salary
sample mean * 100. e The
standardized (beta) coecient gives the standard deviation increase in the specic rate (ratio) due
to a one standard deviation increases in public social spending. f The age of compulsory school
entry in the state the player was born. g The age compulsory school ends in the state the player
was born. h Dummy variable taking value 1 if player won the NCAA title in year he was drafted.
i Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006); null-hypothesis is that instrument is
weak.
24Table 3: Robustness: Estimated Eect of Entry Age on Rookie Contracts, dif-
ferent IVs.
Base salary Signing bonus Total Salary
IVa OLSa IVb OLSb IVc OLSc
Months of birth
Entry Age in Years
Coecient 0.188* -0.097 1.122* 0.442 1.310** 0.344
Standard error (0.099) (0.067) (0.593) (0.384) (0.618) (0.403)
F-Statisticsd 19.733 19.733 19.733
Quarter of birth
Entry Age in Years
Coecient 0.129 -0.097 1.962*** 0.442 2.092*** 0.344
Standard error (0.143) (0.067) (0.722) (0.384) (0.729) (0.403)
F-Statisticsd 24.778 24.778 24.778
Half year of birth
Entry Age in Years
Coecient 0.196 -0.097 2.701*** 0.442 2.897*** 0.344
Standard error (0.192) (0.067) (1.009) (0.384) (0.986) (0.403)
F-Statisticsd 67.838 67.838 67.838
1,673 observations. Specication as in Table 2. *, ** and *** indicate sta-
tistical signicance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent level. Robust standard er-
rors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) clustered for state of
birth in parentheses. a Dependent variable is Base Salary in Rookie Season
in 100,000 USD. b Dependent Variable is Signing Bonus in Rookie Season in
100,000 USD. c Dependent Variable is Total Salary in Rookie Season in 100,000
USD. All Salary Data was obtained from the USA TODAY Salary Database.
d Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006); null-hypothesis is
that instrument is weak.
25Table 4: The Eect of Month of Birth on Entry Age into the NFL.
Month-of-Birth Eect
[p value]
FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
.145 .083 -.012 -.033 .112 .060 .402 .589 .630 .753 .697
[0.261] [0.493] [0.928] [0.800] [0.413] [0.634] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00) [0.00] [0.00]
Note: Estimated coecients from a regression of rookie salary on month of birth.
Omitted category is January. Other covariates that were used in the regression
are height, BCS champion dummy variable, draft-year FE, position FE, team
FE and team*draft year FE. N=1,673. Robust standard errors clustered for the
state a player was born in.
26Table 5: Estimated probability of playing in the next season.
Instrument
quarter month half year
Entry Age -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.086***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
Season -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.144***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Entry Age Compulsory School -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Exit Age Compulsory School 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Size in cm -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NCAA Champion 0.108* 0.110* 0.111*
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Draft Pick Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Team*Draft FE Yes Yes Yes
Position FE Yes Yes Yes
Draft Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Team FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4072 4072 4072
Adjusted R2 0.0957 0.0960 0.0955
F-statistica 64.139 22.817 149.288
Note: Robust standard errors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown
form) clustered for state of birth in parentheses. Estimated coecients from
a linear probability model, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the
player plays in the next season, and 0 if he does not. The estimation is by 2SLS
where we instrument entry age by the quarter of birth, the month of birth or
the half year of the birth, as indicated by the column heading.
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. a Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic (Kleiber-
gen and Paap, 2006); null-hypothesis is that instrument is weak.
27